Insights & Events
November 17, 2026

Is your material outsourcing agreement working hard enough to protect you against the next tech outage?

Financial services firms impacted by last week's global Microsoft outage may be asking themselves whether their outsourcing arrangements go far enough to protect them from future technology outages.

The PRA's and FCA's focus on operational resilience has put the issue firmly on firms' radars. The PRA's operational resilience framework recognises that disruption will occur and requires firms to plan accordingly, including by identifying important business services, setting impact tolerances and mapping and testing the resources needed to deliver them. Yet contractual protection does not always live up to expectations.

Whether caused by a cyber-attack, third-party failure or another technical issue, further disruption to outsourced services should be expected.

So, what should firms be looking for in their material outsourcing agreements?

Business continuity plans need to work in practice

The PRA's SS2/21, which applies to banks and insurers amongst others, expects firms to require service providers in material outsourcing arrangements to implement and test appropriate business continuity plans.

Having appropriate business continuity provisions in the agreement should not in itself provide too much comfort. A business continuity plan that sits in a drawer is going to be of limited value. Firms need to know that it is sufficiently detailed, regularly tested against realistic scenarios and works alongside their own continuity arrangements. Ongoing monitoring, including involvement in testing as applicable, will be important to ensure the arrangements remain sufficiently robust.

Cyber and information security

When contracting on a service provider's standard terms, there may also be limited comfort around the preventative measures it will take against malicious software, cyber-attacks and other security threats. An absolute obligation to prevent such events may be commercially unrealistic, but firms should consider whether appropriate industry standards or specific security measures can be agreed.

Technical and organisational measures are also frequently hidden in a data protection or security schedule. These should not be treated as a box-ticking exercise: legal review is only part of the process and the proposed measures should also be subject to appropriate information security review.

Sub-outsourcing and supply chains

Material services may themselves depend on a chain of subcontractors, so firms should ensure they have appropriate visibility and control over material sub-outsourcing. This should not be considered too narrowly: a cloud or other technology provider may itself form part of the sub-outsourcing chain.

An absolute prohibition on sub-outsourcing without prior consent may be difficult to agree, particularly where a service provider operates a shared service model across multiple customers. Firms should nonetheless seek appropriate notification and approval or objection rights for material sub-outsourcing, together with sufficient information to assess the risks. 

What happens when things go wrong?

Firms should consider what they would need from a service provider if technology disruption affected the delivery of a critical service. This may include prompt notification and regular updates, clear escalation routes and cooperation with the firm's own incident response.

Notification provisions deserve particular attention. Requirements to notify “promptly" or "without undue delay" leave room for disagreement where certainty matters most. Firms should consider including a fixed notification period and make clear that incomplete information should not delay the initial notification.

This assumes even greater importance with the new FCA and PRA operational incident reporting requirements coming into force on 18 March 2027. Contractual notification and information rights need to enable firms to obtain information quickly enough to comply with their own regulatory reporting obligations.

Enhanced monitoring or step-in rights may also be appropriate following serious failures, although firms should consider how workable these would be in practice, including whether they or an alternative provider would have the necessary expertise, information and access.

Don't overestimate service levels and service credits

Appropriate KPIs and service levels are important for monitoring performance and driving the right behaviours. However, a service credit against next month's charges may provide limited comfort if the delivery of a critical service has been materially disrupted for a number of days.

Particular attention should therefore be given to the service levels that matter during serious disruption, including response and recovery times, and the additional rights which arise when those levels are missed.

Will the contract actually provide a meaningful remedy?

Firms should consider whether relevant exclusions and liability caps appropriately reflect the potential consequences of a failure of a material outsourced service.

Force majeure also needs careful consideration, particularly where a service provider seeks protection for technology or infrastructure risks it has effectively been engaged to manage.

Specific termination rights for serious or repeated service failures may also be appropriate. Termination is unlikely to be the immediate priority during an outage, but firms will ultimately need a workable route out if a provider cannot maintain the required level of resilience.

Increasing regulatory scrutiny

Regulators have increasingly recognised the systemic risk posed by the financial services sector's reliance on a relatively small number of technology providers.

In the UK, Microsoft, AWS, Google Cloud and Oracle became the first providers designated under the UK's critical third parties regime in July 2026. This gives the financial regulators direct oversight of certain systemic services but does not remove individual firms' responsibility for managing their own third-party dependencies.

At EU level, the Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) places extensive requirements on financial entities' management of ICT third-party risk, including their contractual arrangements with providers. New EBA guidelines published on 18 September 2026 address third-party risk more broadly.

Takeaways

The contract and the operational arrangements behind it need to work together. Before the next outage, ask:

  • Which of our outsourced arrangements depend on third-party technology?
  • Do we understand our service providers’ critical dependencies?
  • Have relevant BCP arrangements actually been tested?
  • What does the contract require the provider to do during an outage?
  • Taken together, would our service levels, liability, force majeure and termination provisions give us meaningful protection?

Technology outages cannot always be prevented. But understanding dependencies, testing operational responses and ensuring contracts support, rather than hinder, those responses can make a significant difference when the next one occurs.

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Angelica Lovell

Senior Associate
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